Abstract. This paper examines the influence of non-interest activities on bank lending in terms of loan quality and interest spread. We also investigate the possible existence of profit complementarities between non-interest activities and lending. Using quarterly data on 6,921 U.S. commercial banks between 2007:Q3 to 2016:Q3 we find that non-interest activities have no adverse influence on bank credit risk. This is the case for banks of different asset size (including systemically important banks) as well as for distressed banks. There is evidence that banks with assets between $100 million and $1 billion that have a greater share of fiduciary income have lower credit risk. They also have lower interest rates on loans secured by real estate, and higher franchise values, particularly post-crisis. Moreover, banks in the aforementioned size range benefit from synergies in joint production of non-interest income and lending, whereas other banks, in particular smaller banks (below $100 million in assets) suffer from diseconomies of joint production. Larger banks exhibit cross-subsidization between several non-interest activities and lending business. 
A C C E P T E D M
A N U S C R I P T 5 early stage venture capital firms increase the chances of bank loan origination. Firms may also benefit from established bank relationships by signaling their quality resulting in lower loan rates. Bharath et al. (2007) document the benefits of bank-borrower relationships from the perspective of the bank. They claim that strong previous lending relationships increase the chances of attracting new loan and investment banking business. Boot (2000) emphasizes that private customer-specific information is obtained through multiple interactions with the same client over time, often in the form of providing various financial services. The way information is collected and its nature changes when banks engage in more business lines. Banks can obtain information through more channels and have the opportunity to use this information with greater customer interaction. For very large banks, however, the reusability of proprietary information is likely to be limited, because they rely more on hard-information technologies, and provide different financial services through segregated subsidiary corporate structures. The interplay between lending and non-interest activities, therefore, is more likely to be pronounced for smaller banks.
On the basis of extant theories and empirical literature we postulate that engaging in different non-interest activities can affect lending behavior for smaller banks and articulate three arguments in support of the hypothesis that broadening bank businesses can improve loan quality. First, through activity diversification, banks can gather more private information on client quality as well as access a wider array of potential borrowers. Second, information, relationship and reputational factors that can be acquired through various businesses can enhance banks" franchise value and hence increase the potential indirect costs of financial distress, leading to more prudent lending behavior (Marcus, 1984; Keeley, 1990; Demsetz et al., 1996 and Gonzalez, 2005 show the negative relationship between banks" charter value and risk-taking). Finally, revenue from other business areas may also enhance lending as it enables banks to lower interest margins by facilitating information collection from clients.
A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T
6 Carbo and Rodriguez (2007) show that income from non-traditional activities influence net interest margins through possible cross-subsidization effects. However, the empirical evidence is not conclusive. For instance, Nguyen (2012) finds no clear evidence of a negative link between non-interest income and bank interest margins, whereas Lin et al. (2012) claim that non-interest income mitigates the sensitivity of interest margins to shocks.
Non-interest activities also have various drawbacks. First, most fee-based activities are short-term in nature, and have lower switching costs than traditional banking (DeYoung and Roland, 2001 ); hence, in order to establish longer-term client relationships, banks may grant loans to cement non-interest income client relationships. Such a policy could, therefore, undermine the delegate-monitoring role of banks. Banks are expected to produce and convey information on the quality of borrowers, which could be biased if non-interest activities provide incentives for weaker loan screening and monitoring. Lepetit et al. (2008b) find that banks may underprice credit risk if they expect to obtain additional fees from borrowers.
Second, greater reliance on non-interest activities may increase agency problems. Several studies show that agency costs stemming from exacerbated information asymmetries outweigh the benefits of activity diversification (Laeven and Levine, 2007; Elyasiani and Wang, 2009; Akhigbe and Stevenson 2010; Berger, Hasan and Zhou, 2010) 1 . Third, expanding into non-interest activities could be to the detriment of lending. Boot and Ratnovski (2016) show that engaging in too much market-based activities damages relationship-banking. They highlight diseconomies of scope in combining traditional commercial banking and market-based activities, in particular when financial markets are deeper. Lastly, lower credit exposure may encourage managers to be less conservative in their loan-granting activities.
1 Elsas, Hackethal and Holzhauser (2010) find that diversification improves bank value, and provide some evidence against the "conglomerate discount" proposed by Laeven and Levine (2007) and Elyasiani and Wang (2009) .
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In contrast to the afore-mentioned cross-country studies, in this paper we focus on the U.S -because of access to more information on the breakdowns of bank non-interest activities -and investigate the relationship between bank lending and diversification in eight major noninterest business lines 2 . These range from activities such as fiduciary where clients entrust funds for asset management by the bank, to loan servicing which is directly attached to lending. We examine the influence of these activities on banks" lending in terms of loan quality and interest spread. We also investigate the possible existence of profit complementarity ((dis)economies of joint production) between non-interest activities and lending.
We use quarterly data on 6,921 U.S. commercial banks between 2007:Q3 to 2016:Q3.
Since the U.S. banking system is dominated by small banks and business models vary with size, we classify banks into three categories: those with less than $100 million in total assets ('Small' Banks) , with total assets between $100 million and $1 billion ("Medium" Banks) and with more than $1 billion in total assets ('Large' Banks) . This is particularly important for our profit complementarity analysis because scope economies may depend on scale of operation, and it may not be achieved for too small banks. De Jonghe, Diepstraten and Schepens (2015) show that the impact of non-interest activities on banks" performance depends on size.
However, they attribute the positive impact of non-interest activities on the risk of smaller banks to the opacity of such banks, whereas in this paper, using the three sub-samples, we examine the role of size in the economies of joint production.
Overall, we do not find any significant evidence in favor of an adverse effect of noninterest activities on credit risk for banks with different sizes including systemically important banks (assets more than $50bn) and even distressed banks. Our credit risk analysis for medium-size commercial banks with total assets between $100 million and $1 billion indicates
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8 that banks that manage client investments (asset management) have lower credit risk. The relationship is stronger during the post-crisis period. These findings are robust across different specifications, credit risk proxies and estimation techniques. The results help explain the positive relationship between fiduciary and risk-adjusted returns shown by Stiroh (2004) .
Further investigation for this group of banks shows a positive association between fiduciary income and franchise value. Banks with a higher share of fiduciary income earn lower interest income on loans secured by real estate so it could be that preferential mortgage rates are being charged in "exchange" for managing clients" assets.
We also find evidence of cross-subsidization for several non-interest activities and traditional lending-borrowing business, in particular for Large Banks. For instance, the interest rate on loans secured on real estate is negatively correlated to revenue generated from loan servicing and sales. Moreover, banks with higher income from investment banking have, on average, lower interest rates on C&I loans. This is particularly important, because previous studies (Carbo and Rodriguez, 2007 and Lepetit et al., 2008b) typically find more widespread evidence of cross-subsidization effects. In fact, we find that higher deposit services charges are associated with larger interest spreads, which suggests that banks do not use higher deposit fees to subsidize lending rates. Our analysis of Small Banks (those with assets under $100 million) show little evidence of any significant link between non-interest activities, credit risk and price cross-subsidization 3 . Finally, we also investigate pair-wise profit complementarity and (dis)economies of joint production between lending and non-interest activities. We find evidence in support of scope economies for medium-size commercial banks, whereas other banks in particular small commercial banks suffer from diseconomies of joint production. This finding contributes to the literature and provides further evidence on the role of size and scope economies in U.S. banking.
3 Non-interest income have too small weight in total operating income of these banks to affect their lending.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines our methodology and econometric specifications. Section 3 describes the data and summary statistics. Section 4 discusses the results and finally section 5 concludes.
Econometric Specification and Methodology
Our objective is to investigate the impact of non-interest activities on credit risk and interest spreads to seek any evidence on the existence of cross-subsidization between interest and non-interest businesses. For this purpose, we estimate the following dynamic panel models based on Berger and DeYoung (1997) and Carbo and Rodriguez (2007) and Delis and Kouretas (2011) 4 . The variables we consider are the determinants of credit risk and lendingdeposit spreads as highlighted in the literature (McShane and Sharpe, 1985; Clair, 1992; Angbazo, 1997; Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997; Maudos and De Guevara, 2004; Dell"Ariccia and Marquez, 2006; Ogura, 2006; Lepetit et al., 2008b; Foos, et al., 2010) :
Credit_Risk i,t = α 0 + α 1 ×Credit_Risk i,t-1 + ∑ ×Non-interest_Income_Activities k,i,t + α 3 ×Capital i,t + α 4 ×Risk_Weighted_Assets i,t + α 5 ×Size i,t + α 6 ×Loan_Growth i,t + α 7 ×Yield_on_Total_Loans i,t + α 8 ×C&I_Loans i,t + α 9 ×Agricultural_Loans i,t + α 10 ×Consumer_Loans i,t + α 11 ×All_Other_Loans i,t + α 12 ×Short_Term_Loans i,t + α 13 ×Loan_Commitment i,t + ∑ + ∑ + Ɛ i,t
Spread i,t = β 0 + β 1 ×Spread i,t-1 + ∑ ×Non-interest_Income_Activities k,i,t + β 3 ×Capital i,t + β 4 ×Infficiency i,t + β 5 ×Liquidity i,t + β 6 ×Interest_Rate_Risk i,t + β 7 ×Core_Deposit i,t + β 8 ×Wage i,t + β 9 ×Size i,t + β 10 ×C&I_Loans i,t + β 11 ×Agricultural_Loans i,t + β 12 ×Consumer_Loans i,t + β 13 ×All_Other_Loans i,t + β 14 ×Loan_Commitment i,t +
where individual banks and time dimension are represented by i and t subscripts, respectively. Variation in credit risk (Credit Risk) and lending-borrowing spread (Spread) are modelled in Equations (1) and (2) as a function of our variables of interest, namely, income shares from various non-interest activities including fiduciary activities, insurance, annuities,
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A N U S C R I P T 10 loan servicing, investment banking and securities brokerage. These activities are expected to increase the scope of banking operations and extend relationships with borrowers. Moreover, we also take into account non-interest income from loan sales and service charges on deposit accounts. The latter represents how actively clients do banking (the scale of relationship) and/or banks" market power and pricing strategy with regard to servicing account holders.
Both models include a range of bank-level control variables, and time fixed effects.
We use a dynamic panel setting for our study as suggested by Carbo and Rodriguez (2007) and Delis and Kouretas (2011) . This allows us to address the persistence in bank risktaking. We estimate the models using fixed effects, similar to Loutskina (2011) 5 .
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
In model (1) we use the ratio of loan-loss provisions to average gross loans (Loan Loss Provision) as a proxy for Credit Risk. Loan loss provisions are a flow proxy for loan quality and reflect the adjustment of loan-loss reserves and write-offs. As a robustness check, we consider the ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans (Non-performing Loans). This consists of non-accrual loans and loans which are past due for 90 days or more and still accruing. These proxies are widely used in the literature as accounting-based credit risk indicators (for instance Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997; Gonzalez, 2005; Carbo and Rodriguez, 2007; Delis and Kouretas, 2011; Fiordelisi, Marques-Ibanez and Molyneux, 2011) .
For the Spread model (Equation (2)) we follow the literature (Carbo and Rodriguez, 2007; Lepetit et al., 2008b) and use the net interest spread, which is defined as (Spread).
VARIABLES OF INTEREST
5 In the dynamic panel specification the lagged dependent variable becomes endogenous when the sample has a small time dimension (the literature considers this problematic for a sample with less than 15 time periods, whereas in this study we use 32 time periods). Roodman (2009) also suggests applying difference and system GMM techniques to panels with small T and large N. He points out that with large T, a dynamic panel bias becomes insignificant and the straightforward fixed effect technique can be used. In fact, the number of instruments in difference and system GMM tends to explode with T.
A C C E P T E D M
A N U S C R I P T 1) Income from fiduciary activities (Fiduciary).
Clients using fiduciary services entrust their assets to banks for management or safekeeping against payment of a fee. Attracting such clients requires reputational capital and expertise in asset management. Hence, we expect successful banks to have a better chance of selling fiduciary services. Provision of fiduciary services can also improve loan quality, because a) banks can grant wealthy and relatively low-risk clients loans in order to strengthen wealth management ties. These clients may use their assets as collateral to borrow to fund traditional purchases (property etc). Such lending is collateralized and hence is less risky. b) Banks" asset management can benefit from synergies and scale economies associated with managing entrusted funds (Boot, 2003) .
2) Fees and commissions from annuity sales (Annuities).
As pointed out by Boot (2003) , annuity sales are similar to savings products that banks produce jointly to make more use of their expertise in asset management. By using these products, clients establish a long-run relationship and provide banks with stable funding. This financial resource is also likely to enhance bank"s position in lending.
3) Underwriting income from insurance and reinsurance activities and income from other insurance activities (Insurance).
Insurance income provides banks with financial resources (a pool of premiums) under management that may be used partly in lending. Nevertheless, the nature of risk in this 6 Due to a lack of sufficient data, we are unable to take into account income from other activities such as venture capital and securitization activities. Because we focus primarily on lending we do not analyze other items of noninterest income which are not expected to expand the scope of clients" relationships, such as other asset sales.
A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T 12 business requires specific asset management skills that likely limits synergies with credit products. Banks that have more general insurance business are likely to be aware of the items insured -autos, residential and commercial property, other high value goods -that may require re-financing in the future and therefore can suggest lending opportunities. However, offering both lending and insurance services to the same clients may lead to weakening lending standards. This is particularly important for smaller banks where the interplay between lending and other businesses is more pronounced.
4) Investment banking, advisory, and underwriting fees and commissions (Investment

Banking)
Existing studies (Bharath et al. 2007) show that previous lending relationships facilitate investment banking activity. Investment banking can further improve banks" position in lending by providing access to proprietary information. Nevertheless, this potential positive impact might be cancelled out by the associated agency problem and/or loss of focus caused by activity diversification.
5) Net servicing fees (Loan Servicing)
7 .
In undertaking loan-servicing activities banks may underprice mortgage loans and/or target borrowers less likely to make timely instalments so as to boost fees (Wagner, 2009 ). Servicers can also collect soft information and identify borrowers who regularly fulfil their repayment obligations and this information can be used by banks for "improved" future loan origination. Given these two conflicting views, the relationship between Loan Servicing and lending quality is undetermined prior to estimation.
6) Net gains (losses) on sales of loans and leases (Loan Sale).
7 Servicing companies typically receive a percentage of the outstanding amount of the loans they service. Normally, they do not own the loans. Services include statements, impounds, collections, tax reporting, and other requirements. Any person with a mortgage loan pays her scheduled instalments to a loan-servicing firm. Most mortgages (known as conforming mortgages) are backed by Federal housing programs such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
Access to market funding through the sale of loans may depend on reputation in loan monitoring and screening. Therefore, banks have to build a record in lending (a sort of certification effect) before entering into these areas. However, a strong presence in the market and ability to sell the loans easily may encourage banks to invest less in loan monitoring (Parlour and Plantin, 2008) that could lead to a deterioration in loan quality (Purnannandam 2010 We also include income from 8) securities brokerage in our models. The aim is to analyze the implications for credit risk and spread resulting from variation in the aforementioned non-interest activities.
CONTROL VARIABLES
The ratio of equity capital to total assets (Capital) is controlled for in both models. On the one hand, higher Capital is associated with lower moral hazard problems and better capitalized banks have greater monitoring incentives Keeley and Furlong, 1990) . On the other hand, an increase in equity capital encourages risk-taking behavior (Koehn and Santomero, 1980; Kim and Santomero, 1988 and Blum, 1999 among others) . Capital represents equity-holders" risk preferences (McShane and Sharpe, 1985 and A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T We also control for bank size by including the logarithm of total assets (Size) in both models. Size can have several impacts on Credit Risk and Spread: Large and small banks have different business models, the former relying more heavily on non-interest activities given their greater capacity to benefit from diversification and scale economies (Hughes et al., 2001 ). Larger banks may also hold riskier loan portfolios to benefit from safety net subsidies (Kane, 2010) . Moreover, bigger banks mainly deal with larger and more transparent borrowers, while small banks are more likely to lend to small and opaque firms. Alternatively,
large borrowers generally have easier access to financial markets as a substitute for bank lending. Hence, large banks could face higher competition, resulting in greater risk-taking and lower spreads.
In our Credit Risk model (1) we control for Risk Weighted Assets, as it captures a number of risk factors such as borrowers" type and the existence of collateral (Berger and DeYoung, 1997) . We add the quarterly growth rate of gross loans (Loan Growth) to the Credit Risk model, since the literature shows a negative relationship between credit expansion and loan quality (Clair, 1992; Dell"Ariccia and Marquez, 2006; Ogura, 2006; Foos, et al., 2010 In the Spread model (model 2), we control for cost inefficiency (Inefficiency), because less efficient banks are expected to have a higher spread to cover higher costs (Altunbas, Evans and Molyneux, 2001) . We also introduce the ratio of liquid assets to total liabilities (Liquidity) into our model to capture liquidity risk and the difference between loans and securities with maturity over one year and liabilities with maturity more than one year divided by total assets as a measure of interest rate risk (Interest Rate Risk). We expect higher liquidity or interest rate risk to translate into higher Spread (Angbazo, 1997; Carbo and Rodriguez, 2007 and Saunders and Schumacher, 2000 among others) . The share of core deposits in total liabilities (Core Deposit) is also included in Equation (2), as Spread depends on the structure of debt financing. We also consider salaries and employee benefits divided by the number of full-time equivalent employees (Wage) as a proxy for employees" expertise.
Banks with greater expertise are expected to have a higher Spread, since they are expected to offer more specialized and higher valued services.
In both models, we attempt to capture time fixed effects by introducing nine yeardummy variables for the years 2007 to 2015. Year 2016 is considered the benchmark. We also control for seasonal effects by including three quarter dummies, where the last quarter is set as the benchmark. Table A1 in the appendix outlines the variables used in our models.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our empirical investigation is based on a sample of 6,921 commercial banks domiciled in the U.S. The sample is constructed on a quarterly basis between 2007:Q3 and 2016:Q3, providing a total of 165,924 bank-quarter observations. Banks" financial data is collected from SNL, and failed banks are identified from the website of the FDIC. We exclude banks that have been in operation for less than three years and banks with no loans and core deposits.
Outliers are removed from the sample by dropping up to 1% of observations on each tail that lie outside three standard deviation of the mean. The dropping is made in an iterative process, because after cutting outliers in each round, the standard deviation and therefore the domain of observations become smaller. The dropping is stopped when there is no observation beyond three standard deviations of the mean or cumulative droppings reach 1% on each tail.
Moreover, we double-check all variables and their distributions manually to make sure that observations are in an acceptable range 9 .
The U.S. banking system is dominated by small banks with a relatively different business model. As banks become larger their funding strategy, loan composition and income structure tend to change. Therefore, we split our sample into three groups: small banks with less than $100 million in total assets (Small Banks), medium banks with total assets between
$100 million and $1 billion (Medium Banks), and large commercial banks with more than $1 billion in total assets (Large Banks). 
The third part of the 
Empirical Results
CREDIT RISK
We estimate the Credit Risk model (Equation (1)) using our quarterly panel data to investigate whether non-interest activities have any impact on banks" loan quality. We apply the fixed effects technique with standard errors clustered at the bank level. Table II presents the estimation results for Small, Medium and Large Banks during the period under study.
Column (1) illustrates the estimation of the model for Small Banks, where we find no significant relationship between non-interest activities and Credit Risk. Columns (2) to (7) present the results for Medium Banks. In column (2) The average bank considered in their studies is larger and more diversified than the average bank studied in our paper. Petersen (2009) and Thompson (2011) both claim that when the dimensions of panel are extremely unbalanced, there is no need to double cluster at all; however, the former believes that single-clustering on the more frequent dimension (bank in our case) is almost identical to clustering by both dimensions, whereas the latter argues that in this case, single-clustering on the less frequent dimension (time in our case) removes the bias. 12 The results are not reported here, but are available from the authors upon request. 13 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for underscoring this important point.
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instruments are strong and relevant (the null hypothesis that they are jointly zero is strongly rejected) and hence the model does not suffer from the weak instrument problem. We also estimate our model for Large Banks. The result is presented in column (8) and shows no significant relationship between Credit Risk and our variables of interest.
[ 14 The results are not reported here, but are available from the authors upon request. 15 For simplicity, we merely consider size to define Systemically Important Banks. The $50 billion threshold is based on the Federal Reserve Boards proposed rules to define "significant" firms issued on February 11, 2011: http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20110208a.htm. 16 The results are not reported here, but are available from the authors upon request.
non-interest activities by total assets instead of total operating income, because the latter includes net interest income, which is affected by Spread and thereby may display a spurious relationship between Spread and non-interest income items 17 . Table III presents the estimation results of Equation (2) using quarterly data of Small, Medium and Large Banks.
The first column reports the result for the Small Banks sub-sample. We find no evidence of cross-subsidization between non-interest activities and the lending-borrowing spread. Indeed, we observe that Spread is positively associated with Insurance and Service Charge. Banks with higher service charges have higher spreads -so this shows that there is no cross-subsidization in pricing -such a finding reflects pricing power emanating from brand strength (higher quality services earn higher spreads and fees) or market power (or a combination of both). The results also show that better capitalized banks have a higher
Spread. This is in-line with our expectations and the existing literature (Carbo and Rodriguez 2007 Since mortgage loans are more easily saleable in the market, banks that are more active in 
23 that an increase in Service Charge is associated with an increase in Spread, which suggest that banks do not follow a loss-leader strategy in servicing depositors.
[ The linkage between non-interest activities and lending may be due to informational or profit synergies. In this section we investigate whether pair-wise profit complementarity exists between lending and non-interest activities that might contribute to joint production 20 . As such, we examine whether the marginal profit of producing loans increases when they are generated jointly with non-interest activities 21 .
In a multi-product firm pair-wise profit complementarity (PPC) between two products exists when an increase in product A increases the marginal profit of producing product B 22 .
19 Thanks to an anonymous referee for this suggestion, we examine profit synergies. 20 Informational synergy analysis requires detailed data on clients" relationship which are not available. 21 We follow Berger and Mester (1997) and set-up the following multi-product alternative profit function with a trans-logarithmic functional form (Berndt and Christensen, 1973) :
Wherein: TP = the total profit defined as net income before income taxes and discontinued operations. Y is the output vector consisting of: Y1 = Net loans and leases; Y2 = securities plus federal funds sold, securities purchased under agreements to resell and other investments; Y3 = total nominal value of off-balance sheet items; Y4 = the income from the non-interest activities (Fiduciary, Annuities, Insurance, Investment Banking, Loan Servicing and Securities Brokerage); Y5 = the income from service charges on deposit accounts. W is the input price vector comprising: W1 = salary expenses divided by the number of full-time equivalent employees; W2 = expenses of premises and fixed assets divided by total fixed assets; W3 = total interest expense divided by interest-bearing liabilities. Z = the total capital equity. Z is added to the model to control for unmeasured cost of equity capital. Banks with higher equity capital have higher profit as they have less debt financing and hence interest expense, assuming all other factors equal (Hughes and Mester, 2013) . We also impose input price homogeneity restrictions and symmetry assumptions. Since it is not possible to take logarithms of negative numbers, we replace negative total profit (loss) with one and include a variable in the right-hand-side of the equation that takes the value one when total profit is positive and equals the absolute value of the loss, when total profit is negative. 22 This is similar to cost complementarity discussed in Clark (1988) . In this paper we study profit complementarity, because several studies highlight the importance of profit maximization vis-a-vis cost minimization (Berger et al. 2004 among others) , as profit is a broader indicator of corporate"s performance and is more aligned with managerial objectives.
We can then write the measure of pair-wise profit complementarity (PPC) between products A and B as follows:
PPC > 0 implies the existence of profit complementarity between products A and B. PPC = 0 implies non-jointness or an absence of profit complementarities.
PPC < 0 implies diseconomies of joint production. The necessary condition (NC) for diseconomies of joint production (PPC<0) is: The substantial difference between the marginal profits of loans and non-interest activities is due to the fact that lending is measured in the model by the volume of loans, whereas noninterest activities are represented by the net income of such businesses. In the third row, the result shows the necessary condition for diseconomies of joint production is fulfilled. The
fourth row depicts the result on pair-wise profit complementarity suggesting diseconomies of joint production. The impact is economically small. A one percent increase from the mean in non-interest income equals a 0.292% (0.292%=1%×14.28× ) fall in the marginal profit of loans.
[ TABLE IV] As a robustness check, we follow the production approach (Berger and DeYoung, 1997 among others) and include transaction deposits in our model as a further output. The results are presented in the second column. The marginal profit of both loans and non-interest income decreases, because in the production approach total profit is shared among more products. The result on the third row shows that the necessary condition for diseconomies of joint production of non-interest activities and loans is realized, which is in-line with our findings under the intermediation approach. In the fourth row, we observe that the sufficiency condition is also fulfilled and the measure of profit complementarity suggests diseconomies of joint production.
The economic magnitude is small and slightly higher than that of the intermediation approach.
A one percent increase from the mean in non-interest income equals a 0.356% decrease in the marginal profit of loans.
Panel (B) reports our results for Medium Banks. The results on the first column using the intermediation approach show that the marginal profit of loans and non-interest activities are on average lower compared to Small Banks. We find that the necessary condition for diseconomies of joint production is achieved, whereas the sufficient condition is not fulfilled, because the measure of profit complementarity, displayed in the fourth row, predicts economies of joint production. The economic magnitude is tiny. A one percent increase from the mean in non-interest income equals a 0.028% (0.292%=1%×101× ) increase in the marginal profit of loans. The second column illustrates the results for the production approach. In row (3), we find that contrary to the intermediation approach, the necessary
26 condition for diseconomies of joint production is not realized. Row (4) reports the measure of profit complementarity which suggests scope economies between non-interest income and lending. The economic magnitude is larger compared to the intermediation approach; yet it is tiny. A one percent increase from the mean in non-interest income equals a 0.041% increase in the marginal profit of loans.
Panel (C) displays our results for Large Banks. The first column exhibits our results when we follow the intermediation approach. Column (2) reports the outcome using the production approach. In both columns, we find that the marginal profit of loans is higher, but the marginal profit of non-interest activities is lower on average compared to Small and Medium Banks. The results show that the necessary and sufficient conditions for diseconomies of joint production are realized, because both NC and PPC are negative. The economic magnitude is tiny and smaller than that of Small Banks. A one percent increase from the mean in non-interest income equals a 0.029% decrease in the marginal profit of loans under both the intermediation and production approaches.
As further analysis, we limit the sample of Large Banks to banks with $1 to $10 billion total assets 24 . The results predict diseconomy of joint production. The economic magnitude becomes smaller, namely 0.008%, under the intermediation approach; however, it is almost unchanged under the production approach 25 .
Overall, our findings suggest profit complementarity of joint production of loans and non-interest activities for Medium Banks. We find evidence for diseconomies of joint production for both Small and Large Banks. The joint production is less harmful for Large Banks, whereas Small can suffer the most from diseconomies of joint production. 24 The results are not reported here, but are available from the authors upon request. 25 We also study banks with $10 to $50 billion total assets and those with total assets more than $50 billion. The results on these two groups are not statistically reliable, for instance for the former group, we find a negative marginal profit for loans and for the latter group, the results substantially vary between the intermediation and the production approaches.
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Crisis and Post-Crisis Periods
In sections 4. Fiduciary and Crisis to our models.
Columns (1) & (2) illustrate the estimation of the Credit Risk Model (Equation (1)). In the first column, Fiduciary shows a negative relationship with Credit Risk in the post-crisis period, (when Crisis takes the value zero), whereas the coefficient of the interaction term takes a positive sign. The F-test for the significance of the summation of the two coefficients shows that the relationship between Fiduciary and Credit Risk -even though it is weakerremains significant during the crisis. In the second column, we study Large Banks and find no significant relationship between Fiduciary and Credit Risk during both crisis and post-crisis periods.
[
TABLE V]
Columns (3) and (4) display the results for the Spread Model (Equation (2)) for
Medium and Large Banks, respectively. In column (3), we find a significantly negative relationship between Fiduciary and Spread in the post-crisis period. However, the interaction term has a positive coefficient, and the result of the F-test of significance of the summation shows that its magnitude is substantial enough to wipe out the negative link between
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Fiduciary and Spread, and predicts no significant relationship during the crisis period. In column (4), contrary to our findings for Medium Banks, we observe that the negative relationship between Fiduciary and Spread for Large Banks persists during the crisis period.
Overall, the results show that Fiduciary lost its predictive power during the crisis period. This is in-line with empirical banking literature which shows that relationships that hold in normal times tend to change during crisis periods (e.g. Beltratti and Stulz 2012; De Jonghe and Öztekin 2015; Berger et al. 2016 ).
Franchise Value Model 27
So far we find that fiduciary activities lower banks" credit risk. One plausible channel for explaining this finding is via banks" franchise value. In commercial banking, relationships with customers form a core part of intangible assets known as franchise or charter value (Boot, 2017) . Non-interest activities can widen and stimulate such relationships by attracting new clients and increasing the scope of interactions with existing customers. Therefore, in this sub-section, we explore the relationship between non-interest activities and franchise value.
We adopt the following model based on De Jonghe and Vennet (2008):
Franchise_Value i,t = λ 0 + ∑ ×Non-interest_Income_Activities k,i,t + λ 2 ×Credit_Risk i,t + λ 3 ×Inefficiency i,t + λ 4 ×Core_Deposit i,t + λ 5 ×Capital i,t + λ 6 ×Size i,t + ∑ + ∑ + µ i,t
Where individual banks and the time dimension are represented by i and t subscripts, 
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29 also control for capital strength using the equity capital to assets ratio, because banks with less capital are likely to be more risky and hence are expected to have a lower franchise value. We also control for size of banks in our model and predict a positive relationship between size and franchise value. Finally, we include year and quarter dummy variables to capture year and quarter fixed effects.
We estimate the Franchise Value model (Equation (5) In columns (2) - (5), we examine the robustness of our results. In the second column, we follow Petersen (2009) [ 
We find a negative relationship between income share of fiduciary activities and credit risk; however, it could be argued that factors behind fiduciary income might also explain the lower level of credit risk. To control for this endogeneity issue in identifying the impact of fiduciary activities on credit risk, we follow Campa and Kedia (2002) and Laeven and Levine (2007) and use Heckman"s (1979) two-step procedure for estimation of self-selection models.
We define a dummy variable that takes the value one for banks with fiduciary income, and zero otherwise (Fiduciary Dummy) and model banks" decision for providing fiduciary services as a function of a set of bank characteristics and estimate the relationships using a probit model:
Fiduciary_Dummy i,t = f(θX it ) = f(θ 0 + θ 1 ×Risk_Weighted_Assets i,t + θ 2 ×Inefficiency i,t + θ 3 ×Core_Deposits i,t + θ 4 ×Capital i,t + θ 5 ×Size i,t + ∑ + ∑ )
We also define Credit Risk as a function of the Fiduciary Dummy and the control variables described in Equation (1) ("Controls").
Credit_Risk i,t = δ 0 + δ 1 ×Credit_Risk i,t-1 + δ 2 ×Fiduciary_Dummy ,i,t + ∑ ×Controls k,i,t + ʋ i,t (7)
The expected Credit Risk conditional on having fiduciary income is estimated as follows:
E(Credit_Risk i,t | Fiduciary_Dummy i,t = 1) = δ 0 + δ 1 ×Credit_Risk i,t-1 + δ 2 + ∑ ×Controls k,i,t + E(ʋ i,t | Fiduciary_Dummy i,t = 1)
Under the assumption that the error terms in Equations (6) and (7) . To control for factors that lead to choosing fiduciary business, in the first step we estimate Equation (6) using a probit model and calculate λ 1 and λ 2 . In the second step, we estimate Equation (7), after adding the corrections for the self-selection issue.
Credit_Risk i,t = δ 0 + δ 1 ×Credit_Risk i,t-1 + δ 2 ×Fiduciary_Dummy i,t + δ λ [ ( ̂ ) Fiduciary_Dummy it + ( ̂ ) (1 -Fiduciary_Dummy it )] + ∑ ×Controls k,i,t + ʋ i,t = δ 0 + δ 1 ×Credit_Risk i,t-1 + δ 2 ×Fiduciary_Dummy i,t + δ λ λ + ∑ ×Controls k,i,t + ʋ i,t
The sign of δ λ is the same as the sign of correlation of the error terms in Equations (6) and (7). For instance, a negative coefficient indicates that factors that encourage banks to provide fiduciary services are negatively correlated with credit risk.
We estimate our sample selection model 28 ; overall, the analysis shows that even after controlling for self-selection issues, fiduciary activities do lead to a fall in Credit Risk 29 .
The result of estimation of Equation (6) 
Sub-sampling Based on Fiduciary Income
28 The results are not reported here, but are available from the authors upon request. 29 Using a similar approach, we examine the relationship between fiduciary and overall risk, proxied by the standard deviation of return on assets, and how it might be affected when we control for possible sample selection bias. The results show that the negative correlation between Fiduciary Dummy and overall risk of Medium Banks persists even after adding Lambda to the model. 30 The results are not reported here, but are available from the authors upon request.
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It could be argued that banks offering fiduciary services may be different from those without such income and the negative relationship between Fiduciary and Credit Risk is driven by such differences in bank type. We address this concern, by restricting the sample to Medium Banks with fiduciary income and re-estimate our Credit Risk model (Equation (1)).
The results are in-line with our previous findings and show a robust and significantly negative relationship between Fiduciary and Credit Risk 31 .
Summary and Conclusion
This paper analyses the impact of non-interest activities on banks' lending in terms of credit quality and spread. Agency problems and a potential loss of focus associated with diversification into non-interest businesses may cause deterioration in loan quality. we show that an increase in the income share from fiduciary activities in total operating 31 The results are not reported here, but are available from the authors upon request.
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T 33 income lowers credit risk for banks with total assets ranging between $100 million and $1 billion. The impact is more pronounced during the post-crisis period. We find for all bank sizes no evidence that other non-interest activities adversely affect loan quality. We also find no link between non-interest activities and credit risk for systemically important banks (greater than $50bn in assets), or even distressed banks.
In addition, we find some evidence in support of cross-subsidization in particular for
Large Banks (more than $1bn total assets). Their loan servicing and loan sales income is negatively associated with interest rates on secured loans. Moreover, Large Banks with a higher investment banking income tend to charge lower rates on C&I and consumer loans.
Contrary to the aforementioned non-interest activities, income from service charges appears to be positively linked to spread suggestive of pricing market power on loans and other services.
We investigate whether pair-wise profit complementarity or alternatively (dis)economies of joint production exist between lending and non-interest activities. Our analysis provides evidence to support the existence of profit complementarity and scope economies for banks with assets ranging between $100 million and $1 billion, whereas other banks in particular small banks (with assets less than $100 million) actually suffer from diseconomies of joint production.
One can surmise that the very smallest banks -under $100mn, that suffer from diseconomies of scope, are in no position to take on more non-interest activities as this reduces profits. Larger banks (greater than $1bn) appear to cross-subsidize lending from their non-interest activities -for instance C&I and other loan rates are lower for banks that earn more investment banking income. It seems likely that types of credit and lending technologies of banks in the $100mn to $1bn range produce more synergies with non-interest activities in particular fiduciary services and differ from those of bigger banks. Smaller banks have less ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T 34 opportunity or are unwilling to cross subsidize non-interest activities due to size, operational constraints or less competitive pressure in pricing relationship loans.
From a policy and commercial perspective there appears to be diversification benefits derived from combining lending and non-interest activities in particular fiduciary business (at least for banks in the $100mn to $1bn asset size range) so regulators should seek to introduce rules / incentives that encourage this business combination as it can potentially mitigate credit risk problems. Also perhaps antitrust regulators may be further interested in investigating why banks with high spreads also have high service charges. (1)) using quarterly data of 6,921 commercial banks during 2007:Q3-2016:Q3. Small Banks are defined as commercial banks with total assets below $100 million. Medium Banks are commercial banks with total assets between $100 million and $1 billion. Large Banks are defined as commercial banks with total assets above $1 billion. We use Loan Loss Provision as the primary proxy for Credit Risk and regress it on our variables of interest and a set of control variables, using the fixed effects technique with standard errors clustered at the bank level.
In the first column, we estimate our model for Small Banks. Columns (2) to (7) See Table A1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are adjusted for clusters in banks. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. See Table A1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are adjusted for clusters in banks. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. The first column present the results for the profit complementarity analysis under the intermediation approach following Berger and Mester (1997) . In the second column, the multi-product profit function is defined based on the production approach following Berger and DeYoung (1997) .
The results for Small, Medium and Large Banks are presented in panels (A), (B) and (C), respectively. MP_Y1 = Marginal profit of loans. MP_Y4 = Marginal profit of the non-interest activities. NC = Necessary condition for realizing pair-wise profit complementarities. PPC = Pair-wise profit complementarity.
Intermediation Approach Production Approach A C C E P T E D M A N U S C R I P T Table A1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are adjusted for clusters in banks. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
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A N U S C R I P T 45 Thompson (2011) and cluster the standard errors at both the bank and time levels. Column (3) displays the result when we use the lagged value of our explanatory variables. In column (4), we use a dynamic panel setting by introducing the lagged value of the dependent variable in the right-hand-side of the equation. In column (5), we scale non-interest income items by total assets instead of total operating income. Year and quarter dummies are included in the model, but not reported in the See Table A1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are adjusted for clusters in banks. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Table A1 . Variable Description
Appendix -
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This table presents description of variables used in this study.
Dependent Variables Description
Loan Loss Provision
The ratio of loan loss provisions to average gross loans. Loan loss provision is the expense that banks incur to increase loan loss reserves or to write-off a loan.
Non-performing Loans
The ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans. Non-performing loans consist of non-accrual loans and loans which are past due for 90 days or more and still accruing.
Spread
Equals (Interest income / average earning assets) -(interest expense / average interest-bearing liabilities).
Cost of Fund
Total interest expense as a percent of, sum of average interest bearing liabilities and average noninterest bearing deposits.
Yield on Total Loans
Interest income on total loans & leases divided by average total loans & leases.
Yield on Real Estate Loans Interest income on real estate loans divided by average real estate loans.
Yield on C&I Loans
Interest income on commercial & industrial loans / average commercial & industrial loans.
Yield on Consumer Loans
Interest and fee income on consumer loans other than credit card plans as a percent of average consumer loans other than credit card plans.
Fiduciary Dummy
Takes the value one for banks with fiduciary income, and zero otherwise.
Market to Book Value
The market value of equity capital divided by total book value of equity capital.
Variable of Interest 32
Fiduciary
Income from fiduciary activities.
Annuities
Fees and commissions from annuity sales.
Insurance
Underwriting income from insurance and reinsurance activities and income from other insurance activities.
Loan Servicing
Net servicing fees.
Loan Sale
Net gains (losses) on sales of loans and leases.
Investment Banking
Investment banking, advisory, and underwriting fees and commissions
Securities Brokerage
Fees and commissions from securities brokerage
Service Charge
Service charges on deposit accounts in domestic offices, income and fees from the printing and sale of checks, income and fees from automated teller machines and bank card and credit card interchange fees.
Control Variables
Capital Equity capital to asset ratio.
Inefficiency
Total non-interest expense divided by total operating revenue 33 .
Risk Weighted Assets
The ratio of risk weighted assets to total assets. Risk weighted assets are defined by the Basel Accord to measure the riskiness of banks" assets, including off balance sheet items.
Core Deposit
The share of core deposits in total liabilities.
Liquidity
The ratio of liquid assets to total liabilities.
Interest Rate Risk
Difference between loans and securities with maturity over one year and liabilities with maturity more than one year divided by total assets.
Loan Commitment
The ratio of face value of unused credit lines and loans commitment to total assets.
Loan Growth
Quarterly growth rate of gross loans.
Real Estate Loans
The ratio of loans secured by real estate to total loans.
C&I Loans
The ratio of commercial and industrial loans to total loans.
Agricultural Loans
The ratio of loans for the purpose of financing agricultural production to total loans.
Consumer Loans
The ratio of consumer loans to total loans.
All Other Loans
The ratio of all other loans to total loans.
Short-Term Loans
The ratio of loans and leases with a remaining maturity of one year or less to total loans.
Wage
The salaries and employee benefits divided by number of full time equivalent employees.
Size
Logarithm of total assets.
Crisis
Takes the value one for the 2007:Q3 -2009:Q2 period, and zero otherwise.
